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CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH AND THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESS
Senator Charles E. Grassley"
Charles Pou, Jr.**
1. A PERSPECTIVE ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Originally, legal disputes in America that were not resolved by self-help were
litigated and settled in courts. Later, Congress and state legislatures began to
create administrative agencies as more expert, economical alternatives, resulting,
it was anticipated, in better decisionmaking. More formal, bureaucratized systems
have developed in recent years, characterized increasingly by red tape and
regulations. As Chief Judge Loren A. Smith of the United States Claims Court
observed:
In the last several decades we have erected an elaborate and complex
system of procedures to help control our government. These procedures
are embodied in various statutes and codes that would rival any of the
great legal schemes of history.'
Hearings before boards, administrative law judges and other presiders are now
typical of thousands of different conflicts growing out of hundreds of federal
programs. Initially, clients often represented themselves in agency adjudications,
but over time legal adversaries for each side became more and more typical of
administrative processes.
* United States Senator (R-lowa), B.A., M.A., University of Northern Iowa.
** Senior Attorney, Administrative Conference of the United States, B.A., Rice University, J.D.,
Harvard Law School. The authors would like to thank Diane M. Stockton for her research on this
article, and Samuel J. Gerdano, former Minority Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, for his advice.
1. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK i-iv (1985) (Chairman's Foreword).
2. See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF HEARINGS & APPEALS 29 (1985) (SSA Pub. No. 70-032)
("the participation of attorneys has more than doubled from 20% of cases in FY 1970 to 52% in FY
1985").
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While the burdens accompanying this system may be hard to measure
precisely, they are indubitably large.3 A variety of agency boards and offices
handle a diversity of cases raising issues that arise regarding grant, benefit,
regulatory, and other kinds of programs. Jurisdictions of existing offices of
administrative law judges and other boards have been expanded.4 Whole new
sections of the bar have sprung up to service (and instigate) litigation over energy,
contract, environmental, safety, labor, health, and other decisions.
3
This rapid, recent expansion in administrative proceedings and related
litigation is not, of course, a unique or isolated phenomenon. It is part of a greatly
increased reliance on our judiciary to decide all manner of social, political, and
economic issues. Much of this litigation may be an inexorable result of
complicated social and economic interactions, heightened resort to regulatory
schemes to deal with environmental, health and safety, civil rights and welfare
concerns, and other historical factors. However, the point has been reached where
much of it is unnecessary, unproductive, and less than ideally suited for many of
the conflicts involved. More and more administrative, business, regulatory,
employment, benefit, and other decisions are being made by judicial officers
pursuant to marginally relevant criteria in forums not always conducive to efficient
decisionmaking.6
A few doubters have suggested that, relatively speaking, litigation has not
really increased, that America is not an especially litigious society, or conversely,
that it has always been as lawsuit-prone as today.7 These "explanations" are
3. See, e.g., ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., THE COST OF REGULATION FOR THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE: A STUDY OF THE DIRECT INCREMENTAL COSTS INCURRED BY 48 COMPANIES IN
COMPLYING WITH THE REGULATIONS OF Six FEDERAL AGENCIES IN 1977 (1979) (executive summary).
4. Literally scores of statutes in recent years have created new programs enforced via
administrative adjudication. These include, for example, section 101 of the Immigration and Control
Act of 1986, adding sections 274A and 274B to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which created
two new categories of on-the-record APA proceedings for cases involving sanctions against employees
for hiring illegal aliens or for discriminating against individuals (other than illegal aliens) because of
their national origin. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a) & (b) (1988). The Department of Justice has employed four
administrative law judges to hear these cases. For a broad discussion of administrative enforcement,
see Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Agencies, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 435 (1979).
5. The American Bar Association now has sections or committees devoted to matters as diverse
as customs law, dispute resolution, air and space law, construction, entertainment, military law, antitrust
law, business law, family law, international law, labor and employment law, litigation, natural
resources, energy, and environmental law, administrative law and regulatory practice, patent, trademark,
and copyright law, public contract law, public utility law, taxation, tort and insurance practice, and
urban, state, and local government law. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, 1990/91 DIRECTORY iii-v (1990).
6. See, e.g., Administrative Conference Recommendations 86-3, Agencies' Use of Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution, 1 C.F.R § 305.86-3 (1988) [hereinafter Agencies' Use of Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution]; Administrative Conference Recommendations 87-11, Alternatives for
Resolving Government Contract Disputes, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-11 (1988) [hereinafter Alternatives for
Resolving Government Contract Disputes].
7. See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscapes of Disputes: What We Know & Don't Know (&
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious & Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 61, 63
(1984).
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largely beside the point. A vast, diverse landscape of litigation-like activity now
exists in court, arbitration and administrative settings, as well as other less visible
ones. Whether or not we confront a "litigation crisis," we must face the fact that
tens of thousands of administrative decisions and court cases are handled through
highly adversarial sets of procedures that are all too often complex, costly, and
lengthy and can even inhibit consensual resolution.
II. THE DISPuTE RESOLUTION LANDSCAPE
The United States has the largest bar and the highest rate of lawyers per
capita of any country in the world (612,000, double the number in 1960)."
Estimates show that only 1% of the United States population receives 95% of the
legal services provided. 9 The implications are clear. While the largest segment
of the population is precluded from real access to the justice system, the greatest
users of legal services, corporations and wealthy individuals, pay an enormous
price for this justice. With legal expenditures growing at a faster rate than the
gross national product, our nation's overall productivity is almost certainly harmed
by this drain on valuable resources. Much of this time, money and expertise could
be better used for other government, corporate, and personal endeavors10
Federal agencies are involved in far more disputes than ever before (even on
a per capita basis)," and decide far more cases than do the federal courts
(hundreds of thousands annually).1 2 According to former Attorney General
William French Smith, the number of lawsuits in which the United States
government was party rose from 25,000 cases in 1970 to 64,000 in 1980.13 The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts estimates that, for the year
ending June 30, 1987, 30% of all civil cases commenced involved the United
States as a party-over 72,000 actions.' 4 Data from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit indicate that appeals involving the
federal government tend to be considerably more burdensome for the court to
8. National Institute of Dispute Resolution, Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of
Dispute Resolution, in OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 15
(1987) (report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution & Public Policy) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
9. 1d. at 16.
10. The Vice President's Council on Competitiveness has made this point emphatically. VICE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 1-4 (Aug. 1991).
11. Smith, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution: Practices and Possibilities in the Federal
Government, 1984 Mo. J. DISP. RESOL 9, 21.
12. Pou, Federal Agency Use of "ADR": The Experience to Date, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note
8, at 101.
13. Smith, supra note 11, at 10.
14. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & REPORTS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 5 (1987) (table C3, "U.S. District Courts:
Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of the Suit & District, during the 12 month period ended June 30,
1987") (there were a total of 238,982 civil cases in the circuit courts during this time-frame and a
72,022 of these involved the U.S. Government as a party).
1992]
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resolve than other appeals," tending to involve even more lawyers, briefs and
records, and take longer to decide.
Cases are becoming longer as well as more numerous, and a case requiring
a lengthy trial is disproportionately more expensive. 6 Not only does cost include
the trial, where legal expenses tend to increase, but there is also the cost of
protracted discovery, either due to the complexity of the issues or because of the
sheer volume of evidence adduced to resolve the case. 7 In the federal system,
the number of civil trials lasting beyond nine days more than doubled between
1973 and 1983.18 The number of civil trials lasting approximately a month or
more increased almost as rapidly.' 9
From 1973 to 1983, the portion of the gross national product (GNP)
attributable to legal services increased by 58.6% in real terms.2" Estimates reveal
that business spent approximately $5.8 billion for in-house counsel, who constitute
about 10% of all lawyers. 2' The legal services industry's share of the GNP grew
by 30% in one decade. 2 The GNP figure does not include what the public pays
to run courts, such as the cost of judges and government attorneys. 23 Litigation
costs are increasing at a faster rate than overall legal services. 2 In the federal
judicial system, there has been an increase in the number of civil cases filed in
United States District Courts, a 145% increase in the decade between 1973 and
1983.25
Other costs of litigation cannot be measured so easily, but are real. This
includes the value of the time and attention of senior officials, which is especially
costly to corporations.2' These costs also include the diversion of management's
15. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE CASES OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C.
CIRCUIT 3 (July 1982).
16. Id. at 227 & 229.
17. Id. at 229.
18. Id. (from Table C8 of the 1983 annual report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 222.
21. Id. at 225 (the weighted average salary of in-house counsel in 1983 was calculated to be
$63,552, with benefits, support staff, and other associated expenses brings the expenditure per attorney
to approximately $95,000.)
22. Id. (the legal services share of GNP grew from 1.031% of GNP in 1973 to 1.324% in 1983;
this is a 29.7% increase in the share of GNP accounted for by legal services.)
23. Id.
24. id.
25. Id. In 1973, 98,560 civil cases were filed in district courts. DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1973 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1974). In 1983, that
number was 241,842. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TE U.S. COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL
REPORT 21 (1984).
26. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 15, at 225. From 1973 to 1983, civil filings in state
courts increased by 20 percent. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:
CASE FIUNGS IN STATE COURTS 1983 5 (1984).
. [Vol. 1992, No. 1
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time and energy, the costs of delay and uncertainty, lost opportunities, and
damaged business relationships.
27
Due to the costs of litigation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended twice between 1980 and 1985, with further amendments since
proposed. 28 Justice Lewis F. Powell dissented from the 1980 order because he
did not think it went far enough, stating:
Delay and excessive expense now characterize a large percentage of all
civil litigation.... the problems arise in significant part... from abuse
of discovery procedures available under the rules . . .. discovery
practices enable the party with the greater financial resources to prevail
by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent.29
Within the federal bureaucracy, a few examples should serve to illustrate the
problems we face. Administrative caseloads increased by approximately 50%
between 1978 and 1983.30 For example, the Social Security caseload increased
85% from 197831 to 1983.32 During this same period, the Labor Department's
caseload also increased fivefold. a During fiscal year 1986, the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals' (ASBCA) docketed appeals numbered 200% more
than in 1978.' Between fiscal years 1984-1985, the numbers of new appeals and
cases pending at the ASBCA increased by about 20% each.35
In Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law,3 6 Judge Loren
Smith argues that the current level of judicialization is a symptom of a
fundamental dysfunction. He reminds us that "formal methodologies cannot by
themselves resolve the difficult issues that inevitably arise in the context of those
important social programs placed under the auspices of the administrative
27. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 15, at 225.
28. Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost ofLitigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 219-20 (1985)
(the latest amendments under consideration focus upon economic incentives associated with settlement
offers).
29. Id.
30. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 383, 385 (1984) (there were 216,843 new federal adjudicative cases in 1979 and an average
of 391,108 new cases between 1982-1983).
31. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS: STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976-1978 33 (July 1980)
(Uniform Caseload Accounting System) (there were 196,428 new cases SSA in 1979).
32. Lubbers, supra note 30, at 383-85 (there was an average of 363,533 new cases between
1982-1983).
33. Id. The Labor Department reported 2,769 new cases in 1979; this figure rose to an average
of 14,457 new cases between 1982 and 1983. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. In 1984, there were 1369 new appeals docketed and 1729 cases pending at ASBCA. Id.
In 1985, there were 1638 new appeals and 2074 cases pending. Id.
36. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427.
1992]
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agencies"37 and argues that "an infatuation with procedural safeguards . . . is
counterproductive insofar as it has the effect of diverting attention away from
critical substantive problems."
38
Enthusiasm for the potential of alternative means of dispute resolution (ADR)
stems from the hope that they will reduce this burden on courts, agencies, and the
economy, as well as provide better decisions and more satisfying means of justice
for a larger portion of the population. In an era of deficit reduction, the potential
of ADR for improving government decisions must not be overlooked. ADR is not
only in the interest of the government; it is also in the public's interest. Our
society will fail to channel many regulatory and other decisions into new
processes39 at its peril.
III. THE GROWTH AND UTILITY OF CONSENSUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In diverse private sector disputes, consensual means of dispute resolution
have been used to great advantage. These include a variety of family,
employment, environmental, landlord-tenant, divorce, labor, and consumer
conflicts. These ADR methods include negotiation, facilitation, conciliation,
mediation, convening, minitrials, factfinding, use of settlement judges, and binding
and nonbinding arbitration.40
37. Id. at 427.
38. Id.
39. Obviously, methods akin to mediation are hardly brand new, having formed a basic part of
some societies-such as the Chinese-for centuries. See, e.g., Gellhorn, China's Quest for Legal
Modernity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1987).
40. The Administrative Conference's Recommendation 86-3 defines these processes as follows:
Arbitration. Arbitration is closely akin to adjudication in that a neutral third party
decides the submitted issue after reviewing evidence and hearing argument from the
parties. It may be binding on the parties, either through agreement or operation of law,
or it may be non-binding in that the decision is only advisory. Arbitration may be
voluntary, where the parties agree to resolve the issues by means of arbitration, or it may
be mandatory, where the process is the exclusive means provided.
Convening. Convening is a technique that helps identify issues in controversy and
affected interests. The convener is generally called upon to determine whether direct
negotiations among the parties would be a suitable means of resolving the issues, and if
so, to bring the parties together for that purpose. Convening has proved valuable in
negotiated rulemaking.
Facilitating. Facilitating helps parties reach a decision or a satisfactory resolution
of the matter to be addressed. While often used interchangeably with "mediator," a
facilitator generally conducts meetings and coordinates discussions, but does not become
as involved in the substantive issues as does a mediator.
Factfinding. A "factfinding" proceeding entails the appointment of a person or
group with technical expertise in the subject matter to evaluate the matter presented and
file a report establishing the "facts." The factfinder is not authorized to resolve policy
issues. Following the findings, the parties may then negotiate a settlement, hold further
proceedings, or conduct more research.
Mediation. Mediation involves a neutral third party to assist the parties in
negotiating an agreement. The mediator has no independent authority and does not render
6
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ADR has developed into a viable option for tens of thousands of disputants
at the state and local level. Over 20 state legislatures have enacted laws
establishing statewide mediation centers or other dispute resolution procedures;
more than half of the nation's law schools offer courses in dispute resolution;
increasing numbers of elementary and high schools are teaching courses in
"conflict management;" and there are more than 360 non-profit community
resolution programs operating throughout this country.4 ' A 1987 survey of state
court administrators identified 275 operating court-related ADR programs of
various types in over 40 states.42 ADR has proven itself for over a decade in
conflict settlement at the state and local level, including disputes to which state
governments are parties. The federal government can learn from these experiences
of more receptive states and localities with the ADR option. The quick pace with
which ADR has been adapted to conflict resolution at this level illustrates the
flexibility of these techniques. The fact that ADR has been such a benefit in the
settlement of various disputes around the country points to its potential, and
demonstrates that it is not some new high-risk technique but a viable option at the
federal agency level.
While it is often asserted that alternative methods are cheaper and faster than
litigation, numerous factors make it difficult to compare with scientific accuracy
the relative cost and effectiveness of traditional and alternative dispute resolution
methods; nevertheless, much available data and reams of anecdotal evidence
indicate considerable advantages in using mediation and similar means.4 3 An
exact comparison between mediation and litigation is difficult, because of the lack
of parallel data between cases that use each of these techniques. 4" A major
difficulty in evaluating the relative expenses and expedition of consensual dispute
a decision; any decision must be reached by the parties themselves.
Minitrial. A minitrial is a structured settlement process in which each side presents
a highly abbreviated summary of its case before senior officials of each party authorized
to settle the case. A neutral adviser sometimes presides over the proceeding and will
render an advisory opinion if asked to do so. Following the presentations, the officials
seek to negotiate a settlement.
Negotiation. Negotiation is simply communication among people or parties in an
effort to reach an agreement. It is used so routinely that it is frequently overlooked as a
specific means of resolving disputes. In the administrative context, it means procedures
and processes for settling matters that would otherwise be resolved by more formal means.
Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, supra note 6.
41. FriedmanAlternative Dispute Resolution, 1 WASHINGTON LAw. 3, 4 (1987) (president's page).
42. ADR Programs Surveyed by State CourtAdministrators, 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep.
(BNA) No. 16, at 316 (November 26, 1987).
43. See, e.g., Crowell & Pou,Appealing Government Contract Decisions: Reducing the Cost and
Delay of Procurement Litigation with Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 49 MD. L. REV. 183,
197 n.77-78 (1990).
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resolution processes and litigation is the difficulty in finding truly comparable
disputes. 45
Thus, in measuring the relative costs, benefits, and results of litigation and
dispute resolution alternatives, one may be measuring and comparing very
different kinds of things. Many mediated environmental disputes may be resolved
quickly, but voluntary dispute resolution processes are not necessarily fast where
issues are complex. Although mediators generally charge less than attorneys, one
is not necessarily a substitute for the other, and attorneys' and mediators' fees are
not the only costs associated with resolving disputes.' It may be unrealistic to
begin counting the costs of mediation at the time when the parties agreed to
negotiate, when the previous period of contention, litigation, or clarification of
relative power contributed to the parties' willingness to negotiate a voluntary
settlement. Also, filing a lawsuit may be the only way that some of the parties
to a dispute can get the attention of the other side.
Most of the efforts at making cost and benefit comparisons suggest that real
advantages accrue to ADR use. The United States Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) was established to protect Federal personnel systems against
political abuses and create channels within which to resolve employee disputes.4
A pilot study was set up to compare the formal appeals procedure (FAP) with an
alternative appeals arbitration procedure (AAP), later referred to as the voluntary
expedited appeals procedure (VEAP)." The results of the study indicated that
the VEAP cut the time to obtain an initial decision in half compared to the
traditional FAP.4 VEAP expedited the appeals process by more than doubling
the likelihood of a voluntary settlement. 50 VEAP also achieved cost savings of
40% per case compared to similar FAP disputes.5" Agencies were also able to
reduce witness and travel costs in half while minimizing potential backpay
settlements. 2
In the area of government procurement contract appeals, the current system
is cumbersome for a variety of reasons. Many contracting officers fear having
their decisions second guessed which reduces their incentive to settle complex
cases and motivates the contracting officer to hand the appeal over to the boards
45. Some disputes involve complex scientific and technical issues, different statutes may apply
to different disputes, the cases may or may not have precedential value, and the number and types of
parties differ widely.
46. "The burdens of litigation include high legal fees, wasted executive energies, lost opportunities,
prolonged uncertainties, destruction of business relationships, and sometimes impediments to
financing." CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 565 (1988).
47. A. ADAMS & J. FIGUEROA, EXPEDITING SETILEMENT OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES IN THE
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or Claims Court. 3 This willingness to pass along managerial decisions resulted
in staggering increases in Boards of Contract Appeal's caseloads. The active
docket of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has almost
doubled since 19795" without a concomitant increase in manpower. More
recently, Judge Ronald J. Lipman of the ASBCA referred to the fact that the
contractor appeals went from 11,000 in 1977 to 23,000 in 1987, which he feels is
a driving force towards ADR."5
In cases where the Department of Justice's Community Relations Service
(CRS) offered formal mediation services as a means of resolving civil rights
disputes referred by federal district court judges, CRS estimated that mediation
saved $340,000 per case in its evaluation of the court referral pilot project.5 6
In a survey of Fortune 500 companies, approximately 60% found that ADR
has the primary advantage of saving time and money compared to litigation. 7
It has been estimated that a minitrial costs only about 3% of what it costs to
litigate and leads to an expeditious disposition in about 95% of the cases in which
the parties agree to its use.58 Even if an informal settlement cannot be reached,
the cost is money well spent because it can be viewed as preparation for actual
triali 9 According to the same survey, 75% of these ADR users expanded its use
over the last five years.' Five years ago, these corporations disposed of 2.2%
of their litigated cases using ADR; currently they are resolving 6.8% of their cases
in this manner.6'
Simply comparing monetary and resource costs leaves out perhaps the most
important consideration in analyzing the value of settling of a dispute-the nature
and quality of the outcome itself. A trial, with a winner and a loser, may be a
desirable outcome in cases where what is at stake is a matter of principle or law.
Occasionally, the publicity of even a hopeless fight might be better than an
agreement that offers little or no gain. Other times, neither the winner nor the
loser really benefits because of excessive costs and headaches, or because the
decisions in lawsuits can turn on procedural grounds or legal doctrines irrelevant
to the parties' actual interests. In a voluntary dispute resolution process, the
parties are more likely to deal with the substantive issues giving rise to the
53. Crowell & Pou, supra note 43, at 190-91 & 243-45.
54. Id. at 184 n.3 (citing Williams, A Brief Look at the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, 22 PUB. CONT. NEWSL 3, 17 (1986)). The number of cases was 1,221 in 1979; this number
grew to 2,074 by the end of 1985. Id.
55. Appeals Board Judges' Conference Explores ADR Applicability, 1 Alternative Dispute Rep.
(BNA) No. 2, at 32 (May 14, 1987) (federal contracts).
56. COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, OFFICE OF NAT'L LIAISON & POLICY DEVELOPMENT, DEP'T
OF JUST., EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM ON COURT-REFERRED MEDIATION (Feb. 23, 1981).
57. Wilkinson, ADR is Increasingly Effective, Averts Litigation in Many Cases, NAT'L L.J., April
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dispute. Choosing a winner and loser in a lawsuit also may preclude creative
problem-solving or negotiations in search of new alternatives that achieve joint
gains for all parties.62
IV. THE CONGRESS AND ADR
Occasionally, Congress recognizes the value of ADR methods and is
beginning to do so with some regularity. In enacting the Arbitration Act63 during
the 1920's, the legislative branch legitimized a useful method for hearing and
deciding commercial, labor, international," and a variety of other cases-a
method that most American courts had traditionally disfavored. This Act, which
some commentators consider a turning point, helped make possible the
development of an enormous realm of private sector dispute resolution that is now
central to many kinds of activity.
Subsequently, Congress created three federal agencies whose primary goals
were to resolve consensually certain conflicts in key social and economic
areas-the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) for private labor
and age discrimination disputes, the Community Relations Service of the
Department of Justice (CRS) in civil rights and social justice concerns, and the
National Mediation Board (NMB) for railroad and airline disputes.' These
agencies achieved impressive results and stand as eloquent witnesses to the
manifold values of ADR in cases affecting the nation's welfare.6 In other pieces
of legislation, Congress sought to encourage private persons to make use of
mediation-type processes, as with the Dispute Resolution Act of 1980.67 This
Act had little impact, due in large part to Congress' failure to follow up with
funds for implementation.
This brief survey is far from exhaustive.68 However, except for Congress'
successful private sector forays with arbitration, labor mediation in 1947,
community disputes in 1964, and relatively recent ADR initiatives, Congress has
done very little to explore, encourage, or effectuate these useful methods. Far too
often, Congress has either ignored procedural questions while focusing on
62. Id.
63. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-07 (1947).
64. See, e.g., Hoellering, Alternative Dispute Resolution & International Trade, 14 REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 785 (1986). For a world-wide list of arbitral institutions, see International Council for
Commercial Arbitration, 10 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 585 (1985).
65. FMCS was created by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1988).
CRS was established by Title X of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000g- g-1 (1988).
NMB was created in 1934 by an act amending the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-58, 160-62,
1181-88 (1988).
66. See COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, supra note 56.
67. Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (1981 App.).
68. Other statutes authorizing agency arbitration, for instance, include the Foreign Assistance Act,
22 U.S.C. §§ 2395(i) (1988); Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1988); the Public Vessels
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1988); see also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1988) (surveying pending ADR bills in Congress).
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
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substantive and fiscal concerns, or worse, added unnecessary procedural steps to
those already mandated.69
A prime example of the addition of procedural requirements is rulemaking,
including that by the Federal Trade Commission, Environmental Protection
Agency, OSHA, and several others. During the 1970's, Congress subjected
rulemaking to added, trial-type processes. 70 Although some of these "hybrid"
rulemaking procedures originally stemmed from requirements imposed by court
decisions, in the 1970's, Congress did much to codify and extend them." While
some of these processes protect the citizenry, ensuring a thorough airing of all
available evidence, in many cases policymaking processes that were initially
flexible now inhibit and even cripple necessary actions. Currently, they delay
regulatory decisions by requiring records, cross-examination, ex parte limits, and
a host of other hurdles.
72
The problems confronting rulemaking agencies, reviewing courts, regulated
entities, and the public are aggravated by Congress's apparent tendency, noted by
many observers, to avoid using the same procedural language twice. In the words
of Justice Antonin Scalia, Congress engaged in "Balkanizing" administrative
procedure with its diverse procedural requirements. 73 These obstacles, their costs
and complexity, and their potential for delay and exploitation are demonstrated in
69. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, supra note 1, at i-iv. In addition to agency-specific
requirements, we now have, for instance, the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974); the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12; the Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365,
96 Stat. 1749 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.);
the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, title 11, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); the Paperwork Reduction Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C.); the Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.); the Contract
Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 41 U.S.C.); the Freedom of Information Act, Government in the Sunshine Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.); the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, 80 Stat. 308
(1966) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.); the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, §§ 1-
12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); the Federal Tort
Claims Act, ch. 753, title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
70. These examples both include a provision for "cross-examination and rebuttal on disputed
issues of material fact" as well as "substantial evidence review." Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1986); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2605 & 2618 (1976); see also OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING (2d ed. 1991).
71. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, supra note 70, at 197-99.
72. See id. at 199; Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 972-78 (1980).




Grassley and Pou: Grassley: Congress, the Executive Brand and the Dispute Resolution Process
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1992, No. 1
the FTC's attempts at trade negotiation rulemaking under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act.7'
The Administrative Conference, after undertaking a massive study of these
huge proceedings at Congress' direction," concluded that the added procedures
are not effective and should not generally be statutorily required. 76  This
proceduralization of rulemaking often serves to increase the contentiousness of the
administrative process and the incidence of related litigation. To take a single
example, over 80% of the significant rules issued by Environmental Protection
Agency in recent years ended up in court."
It is, to say the least, ironic that relatively little congressional attention
focuses on the impact of the high incidence of hearings and litigation, or on
possible executive and independent regulatory agencies' uses of consensual dispute
resolution methods. Congress originally created many of these agencies to serve
as alternatives to the courts; some might even be viewed as early forms of "ADR"
that have gradually ossified, transformed from a "cure" to being part of the
problem. 78  Agencies are handing over more and more of their decisions to
74. 15 U.S.C. § 57a; see, e.g., Boyer, A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States by the Special Project for the Study of Rulemaking Procedures under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission ImprovementAct, 1979 RECOMMENDATIONS REP. ADMIN. CONF.
41 (executive summary).
75. The following Conference reports exhaustively document these processes: Administrative
Conference of the United States Recommendation 79-5, Hybrid Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal
Trade Commission: Administration of the Program to Reimburse Participants' Expenses, I C.F.R. §
305.80-1 (1989); Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 80-1, Trade
Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1989) [hereinafter Trade Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act]; see also B. BOYER, COMPENSATING PUBL1C
PARTICIPANTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION EXPERIENCE 97
(1981); Boyer, Funding Public Participants in Administrative Rulemaking: The Federal Trade
Commission Experience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51 (1981); Boyer, Report on the Trade Regulation Rulemaking
Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission (Phase I1), 1980 RECOMMENDATIONS REP. ADMIN.
CONF. 33; Boyer & Cartwright, Mobilizing Friends & Foes in Administrative Proceedings, 6 LAW &
POL'Y 451 (1984).
76. Trade Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, supra note 75.
77. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AN EVALUATION
OF EPA'S NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACTIvITIES 1 (1987).
78. Contract disputes may be viewed as a prototype. The growth in the number, complexity, and
cost of these cases is described in Appealing Government Contract Decisions: Reducing the Cost and
Delay of Procurement Litigation With Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques. The authors state
that in recent years:
hearings on the merits became more formalized and extensive. Caseloads and backlogs
increased, disputes became more heavily lawyered, and discovery and motions practice
were introduced and expanded. More and more decisions took longer to be reached, and
read. Many applauded these trends as enhancing contractors' due process rights; other
viewers decried them as inducing delay, bureaucratic irresponsibility, and litigation
expenses.
Crowell & Pou, supra note 43, at 188.
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judicial-type officials, who reach decisions based on increasingly longer hearings
and lengthier records. Congress, itself, is largely responsible for this eventuality,
abetted by court decisions requiring more judicialized procedures and
second-guessing by the Inspector General and other oversight bodies that act deter
risk-taking by agency officials.
By contrast, several state legislatures have acted quite boldly and
imaginatively in furthering ADR use. Several states created central dispute
resolution offices with missions of increasing state court or administrative uses of
ADR.79 These offices vary in precise functions, but generally include building
agency and public awareness of ADR options, setting up mediation programs or
mediating specific agency or court disputes, consulting with interested state
agencies, compiling rosters of neutrals, and suggesting legislation.80
In those relatively few laws where Congress did think to encourage the
executive to make use of consensual dispute resolution methods, the results are
typically encouraging. The Civil Service Reform Act of 197881 created the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) to hear employee grievances, and encouraged
that agency to use alternative appeal processes like conciliation, mediation,
arbitration, and similar methods mutually agreeable to the parties.8 2 The MSPB
followed up with an experimental "voluntary expedited appeal procedure"(VEAP)
featuring expedited schedules, mediation, and curtailed interagency review.13 The
Whatever the merits of these various viewpoints, in 1978 the judicialized model of claims
resolution prevailed with the enactment of the Contract Dispute Act (CDA) due in large part to a few
court decisions finding broad due process rights and agitation by some private bar and board members.
See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); United States v. Carlo
Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
79. See Susskind, NIDR's State Office of Mediation Experiment, 2 NEGOT. J. 323, 323 (1986);
Statewide Offices of Mediation: Experiments in Public Policy, 1987 DISPUTE RESOL F. 3, 3 (1987).
States with offices now include Massachusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii, Ohio, Oregon, and Florida.
80. Susskind, 2 supra note 79, at 323.
81. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., 39 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
82. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1988). Congress gave the MSPB wide latitude to develop alternative
dispute resolution procedures.
The Board may, by regulation, provide for one or more alternative methods for settling
matters subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Board which shall be applicable at the
election of an applicant for employment or for an employee who is not in a unit for which
labor organization is accorded exclusive recognition, and shall be in lieu of other
procedures provided for under this section.
§ 7701(h), 92 Stat. at 1139. The Senate report, which accompanied passage of the CSRA, urged the
MSPB to develop alternative methods for resolving appealable matters including "suitable forms of
conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and other methods mutually agreeable to the parties." S. REP. No.
969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1978).
83. The cost-effectiveness of the VEAP was discussed above in connection with the utility of
consensual dispute resolution. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
1992]
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MSPB attributes its approximately 35% increase in recent settlements in part to
the mediation and related processes emphasized in the VEAP.8
4
Congress has, on occasion, encouraged experimentation in some Superfund,
pesticide-related, and other environmental cases. It explicitly authorized arbitration
of Superfund claims in cases where the total response costs are $500,000 or
less.'5
Congress' most recent excursions into ADR appear to hold great promise.
In January 1988, the Agricultural Credit Act6 called on the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Farm Credit Administration to make
use of state farmer-lender mediation programs already required by several
legislatures.8 7 Previously, USDA held the position that its status as a federal
agency administering federal programs exempted it from these laws as a result of
the "preemption doctrine.""s Congress' action, which was accompanied by a
requirement for USDA to offer matching grants to support and encourage these
state-level mediation programs, should serve to protect thousands of farm families
from hasty foreclosures and debilitating legal fees. Indeed, a recent
recommendation by the Administrative Conference suggests that the program has
been quite valuable.89
. Several other recent laws offer hope for remedying the results of
congressional inattention and improving federal agencies' unenthusiastic reception
to ADR.9 The 101st Congress approved a law to encourage expanded use of
negotiated rulemaking. The "Negotiated Rulemaking Act,"91 of which the
principle author was a co-sponsor, sets up a framework for agencies to establish
84. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 971 Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 108 (1990) (statement of Llewellyn M. Fischer, General Counsel, MSPB).
85. See generally Mays, ADR & Environmental Enforcement: A Noble Experiment or a Lost
Cause?, 18 ENvrL L. REP. 10087 (1988).
86. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 12
U.S.C.).
87. L. Riskin, A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, The Farmer-Lender
Mediation Program: Implementation by the Farmers Home Administration 10 (Nov. 15, 1991).
88. Id. at 8 n.40.
89. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 91-7, Implementation of
Farmer-Lending Mediation by the Farmers Home Administration, 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-7 (1992) (this
recommendation was based largely on Professor Leonard Riskin's excellent report, see supra note 87).
90. For a general survey of ADR-related bills pending in Congress, see the ABA's survey,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Legal System. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUtION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1988). A few agencies have taken initiatives for ADR and
negotiated rulemaking, including some adjudications in parts of the Army Corps of Engineers, EPA,
Department of the Navy, and Health and Human Services' Grant Appeals Board. See generally
Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures & the Administrative Process, 1
ADMIN. L.J. 141 (1987); Office of the Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States, An
Overview of Federal Agency Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 405
(1987).
91. 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (1990).
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rulemaking negotiating committees.92 Further, the Act authorizes funds to assist
agencies in implementing the negotiated rulemaking process, to provide training,
and to pay certain expenses of negotiating committees.93 The Act also provides
for the Administrative Conference of the United States to act as a clearinghouse
for assistance, information and study regarding regulation and negotiation.
94
Negotiated rulemaking has been used repeatedly at the EPA and the Departments
of Transportation and Labor with success, and several other agencies have begun
experimenting."
V. SPECIAL ISSUES IN AGENCY ADR
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act)p makes a variety
of helpful changes in the law. The Act, which the principal author initially
introduced in 1988, encourages and extends the use of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) by agencies and makes life easier for those who choose to take
advantage of it. The ADR Act recognizes that, as with private disputes, ADR is
not appropriate for all cases involving the government. The Act also seeks to deal
with the fact that agency use of some kinds of ADR-mainly arbitration-may
raise policy, practical, and even legal concerns that are not present in most private
sector disputes. The introductory article in the Administrative Conference's
Colloquium on Improving Dispute Resolution: Options for the Federal
Government97 sets forth these concerns at some length. Briefly stated, they
include the following:
(1) Disputes involving the government's rules and enforcement
activities often have greater impact and precedential value than
most private sector lawsuits.
(2) Needs for open processes and for assigning executive
responsibility can deter negotiations.
(3) Some officials fear using ADR because finality of negotiated
decisions often cannot be guaranteed.
92. Id. at § 581. Negotiated rulemaking is discussed in greater detail below. See infra text
accompanying notes 111-25; see also ADMINISTRATIvE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1990).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 582.
94. Id. at § 583. The bills incorporate the basic provisions of Administrative Conference of the
United States Recommendation 82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. §
305.82-4 (1982) [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 82-4]; Administrative Conference of the United
States Recommendation 85-5, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5
(1985) [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 85-5].
95. See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text (where this process is discussed in greater detail
below, along with agencies' experiences).
96. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 9
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 41 U.S.C.).
97. Office of the Chairman, supra note 90 at, 407-10.
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(4) Public interests often are less clearly defined than those of private
entities, and government officials' decisions are more susceptible
to second-guessing by Congress, press, and other agency
employees.
(5) Public access and other procedures imposed by statute or court
decisions can inhibit negotiations.
(6) The General Accounting Office from early in the century
prohibited the use of outside arbitrators to determine the liability
of the U.S. government.
(7) Some delegations of governmental decisionmaking authority to
private arbitrators may on occasion raise constitutional
questions.9"
(8) Budget limits and tight procurement procedures can deter or delay
acquisition of the services of private mediators.
(9) Agencies' negotiated settlements may sometimes be subject to
more judicial review than private agreements, adding uncertainty
to efforts to use innovative procedures. 99
Even taken together, these obstacles are far from insuperable. Some have
been dealt with by statute, such as the General Accounting Office's hidebound
opposition to nearly all forms of arbitration involving claims by or against the
government. Others can be easily exaggerated. Most of the above concerns can
be dealt with by careful attention to detail in implementing a mediation or other
ADR procedure. Alternative dispute resolution should not lead to unsupportable,
"backroom" decisions; however, processes can be developed to ensure that
flexibility needs do not overwhelm the concern for accountability. As Marshall
J. Breger, former Chairman of the Administrative Conference, noted in his
testimony on the proposed ADR Act before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice:
[A]gency officials already routinely negotiate and adjust tens of
thousands of disagreements over contracts, penalty assessments, and
other major decisions pursuant to guidance that is generally viewed as
adequate. To take one instance, the Office of the Inspector General at
the Department of Defense has specifically endorsed the documentation
standards developed by the Administrative Conference for ADR in
contract claims; indeed, that Office specifically approved the use of
ADR in one large, controversial case by the Corps of Engineers as
being in the government's best interest. Criticizing current dispute
procedures, the Inspector General applauded the Corps' innovative
98. See Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 87-5, Assuring the
Fairness & Acceptability of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-5 (1987); Bruff, The
Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 445 (1989).
99. Office of the Chairman, supra note 90, at 407-10.
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approach and predicted "good things ahead" for the Corps' program.
The Environmental Protection Agency has likewise been pursuing
alternatives to conventional processes with success. What these
examples demonstrate is that, in the federal arena, the mere existence
of a formal dispute or presence of a mediator does not render suspect
the consensual settlement worked out by the parties. 1' °
A crucial point is that, apart from arbitration, all ADR methods allow agency
decisionmakers to retain all of the decisional authority they ordinarily have. They
simply serve to facilitate or expedite the process for reaching the decision, and
parties should not view them as an exotic new species of procedures.
VI. AGENCIES' INITIATIVES TO DATE
On their own, with little or no congressional encouragement, a few agencies
have begun to make use of ADR. Contracting agencies like the Army Corps of
Engineers adopted policies to further use of minitrials, mediation, summary
proceedings, and related forms of ADR."'0 Among contractors and government
officials these efforts respond to dissatisfaction with the present system, where it
is not atypical for cases to take three to four years from filing to decision. In fact,
some cases have taken ten to twelve years.1"2 Among the problems created by
this system are those described by Lester Edelman, Chief Counsel of the Corps of
Engineers:
The most significant dissatisfaction is the disruption to management,
which leaves both the claimant and the government complaining. To
support the litigation, the parties are forced to pull technical experts and
professionals from other projects. This results in the ripple effect of
litigation on management operations. An entire industry has been
created to provide additional experts and consultants to support the
litigation efforts, further adding complexities and costs to both
sides. 0 3
The Corps' solution was to begin developing processes that are quicker, less
costly, and more consensual.
The Corps examined the minitrial process, which was originally
developed in 1977 to resolve a patent infringement suit. After
100. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1988).
101. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Commander's Policy Memorandum No. 11,
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Aug. 7, 1990).
102. Edelman, Applying ADR to Contract Claims, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 553, 555 (1987).
103. Id. at 556.
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reviewing this ADR technique, the Corps decided to fully develop the
concept to match the Corps unique organization. The adapted minitrial
was then tested and evaluated in a pilot program. The result of the pilot
program was the resolution of several complex contract claims in a
matter of months. These claims most likely would have taken years to
conclude had litigation been used. In addition, the minitrial was
inexpensive to use, and the disruption to management was minimal..
. In designing the ADR programs for the Corps, it was not forgotten
that the thrust of the programs were and are based on the belief that the
resolution of disputes is most often a management problem, rather than
a legal problem, and that the Corps wanted to use managers, not
lawyers, as decisionmakers. 1° 4
The Corps repeatedly used this and related processes to resolve claims since
1984.105 Its lead was followed by the Department of the Navy and the United
States Claims Court."° The Environmental Protection Agency, in environmental
enforcement cases, also made use of minitrials, mediation, and related ADR
methods. An Administrative Conference study 10 7 concluded that "ADR has
adapted well to traditional agency decisionmaking formats . . . [w]here these
methods have been used, they have worked."'0 8 The Administrative Conference
in its 1987 recommendation on resolving contract disputes endorsed these
agencies' efforts to all contracting agencies."19 The Conference called on
agencies to adopt pro-ADR policies and take other training and related steps to
"begin creating an atmosphere in which these methods can be readily
employed."' 10
Another area of creative activity involves rulemaking. Even without
congressional prodding, negotiated rulemaking emerged in the 1980's as an
alternative to traditional procedures for drafting proposed regulations at several
agencies. The basic idea is that in certain situations it is possible to bring together
representatives of the various contending interests under the auspices of the agency
to negotiate the text of a proposed rule."'
Negotiated rulemaking gives parties an opportunity to participate at an early
stage of rulemaking, in a setting that fosters a will to reach a consensus and
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Crowell & Pou, supra note 43, at 203.
106. Department of the Navy, Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, Memorandum from the
Secretary, in SouRcEBoOK, supra note 8, at 847; United States Claims Court, General Order No. 13,
Notice to Counsel on Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 731.
107. Alternatives for Resolving Government Contract Disputes, supra note 6; Crowell & Pou,
supra note 43; see also Edelman & Carr, The Mini-Trial: An Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedure, 42 ARB. J. 7 (1987); Harter, supra note 90.
108. Crowell & Pou, supra note 43, at 254.
109. Alternatives for Resolving Government Contract Disputes, supra note 6.
110. Id.
111. ACUS Recommendation 82-4, supra note 94.
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encourages them to set their own priorities among the issues to be considered and
to make tradeoffs among them. If the negotiators can reach a consensus on a draft
for agency consideration, through a process of evaluating their own priorities and
making tradeoffs to achieve an acceptable outcome on the issues of greatest
importance to them, then the likelihood of subsequent litigation is diminished." 2
However, reducing the risk of costly litigation is not the only benefit of negotiated
rulemaking. Persons who must ultimately be governed by the rule are more likely
to understand the practicalities of living with the rules, and should find negotiated
rules more acceptable. Moreover, by avoiding litigation, regulated businesses, or
others who need to plan for the future, can plan for implementation earlier than
would otherwise be the case. Participation in the drafting can avoid
misunderstandings about the meaning of the rules, and can also foster a more
cooperative relationship for future dealing among the affected parties and the
agency. The negotiated rulemaking process was assessed as follows by EPA's
Program Evaluation Division, after an intensive review:
Negotiated rulemaking can sometimes be better than the conventional
rulemaking process. In the 'right' situations, negotiated rulemaking can
produce proposed rules that meet statutory requirements but are more
pragmatic than proposals EPA would be likely to develop on its own
and may produce better environmental results; in addition, negotiated
rules are more likely (than conventional rules) to be accepted by the
affected industries and other interested parties involved in developing
them. Negotiation also may reduce the time it takes to proceed from
proposed to final rulemaking.13
That office concluded that negotiations facilitated exchanges of information and
understanding of the issues, made final rulemaking easier and less costly, and
created working relationships that helped some participants work together
constructively in other situations."' These negotiated rulemaking processes stem
in considerable part from a series of reports and recommendations of the
Administrative Conference beginning in 1981."5 These reports deal with
112. Id. Negotiated rulemaking should be viewed as a supplement to the rulemaking provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966). This means that the negotiation sessions
generally take place prior to issuance of the notice and the opportunity for the public to comment on
a proposed rule that are required by the Act. Id.
113. EPA Program Evaluation Division, Office of Management Systems and Evaluation, Office
of Policy Planning and Evaluation, An Assessment of EPA's Negotiated Rulemaking Activities, in
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at appendix.
114. Id.
115. ACUS Recommendation 82-4, supra note 94; ACUS Recommendation 85-5, supra note 94;
see also Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Perritt, Analysis
of Four Rulemaking Efforts, 1985 RECOMMENDATIONS REP. ADMIN. CONF. 637; Perritt, Negotiated
Rulemaking in Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 471 (1986), Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking:
Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendation by the Administrative Conference of the
United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1630-36 (1986) [hereinafter Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal
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procedures for negotiated rulemaking, characteristics of rulemaking proceedings
that favor use of a negotiated alternative, and participation by agencies. 6
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the first federal agency to try
using negotiated rulemaking, assembled a committee in 1983 to negotiate a
revision of flight and rest time requirements for domestic airline pilots." 7 The
committee included representatives of airlines, pilot organizations, public interest
groups, and other interested parties."" The prior rules had been in effect for 30
years, a period of substantial change in the airline industry in which the FAA had
to issue more than 1,000 pages of interpretations. 9 On several occasions, the
agency proposed revisions, but withdrew them because of substantial opposition.
A final rule based on the negotiations was adopted in 1985; it has not been
challenged in court. The Department of Transportation followed this successful
use of negotiated rulemaking by convening advisory committees to negotiate
several other proposed rules. 2
The Environmental Protection Agency has used negotiated rulemaking in
several important proceedings, and is committed to expanding its use of the
procedure.' Final rules negotiated by EPA include clean fuels requirements,
penalties for manufacturers of vehicles not meeting Clean Air Act standards,
emergency exemptions from pesticide regulations, performance standards for
woodburning stoves, and inspection and abatement of asbestos-containing materials
in school buildings. 22
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) convened
committees to negotiate proposed standards for worker exposure to benzene and
to a chemical known as MDA, an animal carcinogen used in the manufacture of
plastics.1 23 Although the benzene effort did not result in a negotiated rule, the
MDA committee did submit a set of rcommendations to OSHA for a rule. 24
Other agencies that use negotiation procedures in rulemaking include the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the Departments of
the Interior and Agriculture. In addition to EPA's negotiated rulemaking activity,
its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring has taken the lead in using
ADR in enforcement cases. In late 1987, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas issued
Agencies] (expanded version).
116. ACUS Recommendation 82-4, supra note 94; ACUS Recommendation 85-5, supra note 94.
117. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 327-28; Negotiated
Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies, supra note 115, at 1667-74.
118. Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies, supra note 115, at 1667-74.
119. Id.
120. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 328-30.
121. 48 Fed. Reg. 7494 (1983).
122. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 330-36.
123. Id. at 336-37; Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies, supra note 115, at 1647-67.
124. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 336-37.
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a memorandum calling on EPA's regional offices to begin making greater use of
ADR in these situations."
VII. PRESCRIPTIONS
The federal government is in an ideal position to serve as a beacon for the
rest of our society. Its agencies should be far more active in using consensual
dispute resolution. Instead, almost all lag far behind the remainder of our
country's dispute processors. Indeed, more than one knowledgeable observer has
noted that while top echelon officials at the Department of Justice sung the praises
of ADR, line litigators often clung tenaciously to the motions and discovery
practice with which they are comfortable and disdain less adversarial
approaches.126 This duality must come to an end; ADR must cease being "one
of those subjects that receives almost universal endorsement in theory but
substantially less in practice. 1 27  This attitude should be replaced, with
government attorneys, program officials and presiding officers viewing alternative
means of dispute resolution as a major set of tools that can be routinely considered
and aptly used.
How is this change to come about? It is likely that the impetus for
meaningful change will have to come from the top - levels of
government-Congress and top executive officials. Otherwise, line employees
may prefer the safety of the status quo to experimentation. There is evidence that,
with the recent report and executive order on Civil Justice reform, the executive
branch has begun to deal with this situation. With the new Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act, Congress sends a clear signal to agencies, reviewing courts and
regulated persons that "ADR is OK," and that informed, thoughtful efforts to use
it will be supported. The Act goes far to establish a pro-active government policy
in favor of public sector use of mediation and similar methods. By amending the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to authorize parties to fit the process to the
case-at-hand, the Act also affords parties the flexibility to use ADR in those cases
in which routine processes would inhibit dispatch or consensual resolution.
General Accounting Office's overly restrictive prohibition on arbitration has been
repealed for those cases in which arbitration can be used consistently with the
public interest. Specific statutory provisions that inhibit effective negotiation-for
instance, parts of the Federal Tort Claims Act 128 and Contract Disputes Act'29
125. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Memorandum from Administrator Lee M.
Thomas to Assistant Administrators, Final Guidance on Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques in Enforcement Actions (August 14, 1987) (available at the Environmental Protection
Agency, Washington, D.C.).
126. See, e.g., Mays, supra note 85, at 10091; Administrative Conference Colloquium on
Improving Dispute Resolution: Options for the Federal Government, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 399 (1987).
127. Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to ADR, 1 NEGoT. J. 29, 32-35 (1987).
128. Ch. 753, title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
129. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31
U.S.C., and 41 U.S.C.).
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-were also amended.130  Vital efforts at training government personnel to
negotiate better and judicial officers to take greater advantage of mediation and
other ADR processes are encouraged.
The Act amends the APA 131 to authorize the parties specifically to agree
to use mediation, simplified or expedited procedures, or other mutually agreeable
processes to resolve disputes arising under federal administrative programs.
132
Although the use of ADR is not necessarily inconsistent with APA requirements,
the bill will resolve any doubt about the compatibility of ADR with current APA
requirements. Arbitration is included subject to general guidelines on issues likely
to be apt or inapt for ADR.13 3 The ADR Act also includes necessary guarantees
of confidentiality in agency ADR, and provides judicial review processes that
balance the needs for expedition, finality, and accountability. 34 The Act takes
steps to make it easier for agencies to use ADR. For instance, it authorizes them
to accept volunteer services from mediators or other "neutrals" and to hire them
promptly and efficiently.135
The Act amends the Federal Tort Claims Act to raise the extent of agencies'
settlement discretion from the present $25,000. 36 The current level, set decades
ago, requires Department of Justice approval of many proposed settlement
agreements in small cases that raise no significant issues. It also serves to chill
settlement discussions, since agencies often cannot negotiate effectively. The Act
amends the Contract Disputes Act to encourage agency contracting officers and
boards of contract appeals (BCA) to use consensual methods to settle acquisition
disputes and it specifically authorizes use of ADR in contract disputes, subject to
the aforesaid guidelines. 37 These changes will greatly enhance the flexibility
of contracting officers, boards of contract appeals, and contractors to use minitrials
and other appropriate means to handle contract claims better. The changes will
also encourage other agencies to follow the initiatives of the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Department of the Navy, and the Claims Court in an area where
litigation increased almost exponentially in recent years.
The Act enlarges the authority of the Administrative Conference of the
United States and the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service to aid agencies'
use of current resources to achieve better decisions with ADR.'38  One
commentator has noted that the Administrative Conference has led in
recommending the appropriate uses of ADR to federal agencies. 139 Its expertise
in agency administrative processes, experience in working with agencies in ADR,
130. ADR Act, §§ 6 & 8, 104 Stat. at 2745-47.
131. Ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
132. ADR Act, § 4, 104 Stat. at 2737-45.
133. Id.
134. See id. §§ 4-5, 104 Stat. at 2740-41 & 2744-45.
135. Id. § 4, 104 Stat. at 2739-40.
136. Id. § 8(a), 104 Stat. at 2746-47.
137. Id. § 6(a), 104 Stat. at 2745-46.
138. Id. §§ 4 & 7, 104 Stat. at 2737-46.
139. See, e.g., Mays, supra note 85.
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and its unique relationship with both federal agencies and private sector experts
can make it a key participant in the effort that is needed. For these reasons, the
Act creates new roles for the Conference in supporting, assisting, and monitoring
agencies' ADR use. 140 Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service's (FMCS)
authority is increased to include mediation, training and other assistance in
resolving administrative disputes.
141
A basic premise of the new Act is that increasing the number of dispute
resolution methods available to government officials will enhance the operation of
the government and better serve the public. The Act authorizes a lot, demands
very little, but offers tremendous opportunities. Its four principle requirements are
(1) for each federal agency to designate a senior official as dispute resolution
specialist, (2) to review all programs systematically for ADR potential and to
develop, in consultation with the Administrative Conference and FMCS, a policy
on ADR use, (3) to provide training for selected personnel, and (4) to review
grants and contracts for inclusion of clauses encouraging use of alternatives.142
A dispute resolution policy should not be thought of as simply a document
to be written and put into agency manuals, though that certainly may be a part of
it. Developing a policy should set in motion a process within each agency, with
the designated agency dispute resolution specialist as initial catalyst and long-term
nurturer. First, the dispute resolution specialist and selected, key personnel in each
agency should become familiar with the variety of consensual processes now
available. For most agencies, additional training in mediation skills for some
personnel will be advisable to create in-government cadres of potential dispute
resolvers. Once a specialist, or the specialist's staff or work group, is familiar
with these processes and any legal or policy issues they raise, they should review,
with other affected officials, and private entities, each category of dispute in which
the agency is typically involved. Section 3(a)(2) of the Act lists several categories
for review: formal and informal adjudications, rulemaking, enforcement actions,
issuing and revoking licenses or permits, contract administration, litigation, and,
just in case anything got left out, "other agency actions."'43 The message here
should be clear. The term "dispute" should not be construed narrowly; it goes far
beyond court litigation and focal APA adjudication to encompass virtually any
dispute concerning an agency program. Clearly, agencies should take a similarly
broad view in reviewing areas where ADR methods may be useful.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A variety of quantitative and qualitative benefits emerge from the use of
more consensual means of agency dispute resolution. Their successes at the court,
state and local levels, and even in the few experiences at the federal level, provide
140. ADR Act, § 4, 104 Stat. at 2737-45.
141. Id. § 7, 104 Stat. at 2746.
142. Id. § 3, 104 Stat. at 2736-37.
143. Id. § 3(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 2737.
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agencies with opportunities to learn, to emulate, and to innovate. Recent
initiatives must be complemented by informed, periodic congressional oversight,
and by creation of incentives for high level executive branch officials and other
agency personnel to use ADR. In the long run, whatever slight costs may be
involved will be far outweighed by the improvements in decisionmaking and the
greater satisfaction of participants. Conceivably, these efforts might mark the
beginning of a new trend, away from formalized procedures toward a new
flexibility that realistically recognizes limits on our resources.
Trite but true, justice that is delayed or excessively costly is denied, and
administrative justice need not be so expensive or time-consuming. The Congress
and the Executive Branch should accept the challenge of working together for
improvement. The successes of ADR methods in other arenas have all but
eliminated the risks for the federal bureaucracy. The recent legislation gives
agencies encouragement to innovate. The opportunity is ripe.
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